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Rudanko draws our attention to a fallacy which is not well known in argumentation 
theory: the ad socordiam fallacy. This is a fallacy which describes a discussion move 
used to postpone a matter in the hope that it will be forgotten and never taken up again. 
There is a saying: “One of these days is none of these days”; this appears to hold 
particularly well for an ad socordiam fallacy, as its proponent is indeed talking about a 
future event on “one of these days” in the hope that it happens on “none of these days.”  
In order to create some familiarity with the ad socordiam fallacy, Rudanko 
presents us with a case study taken from the historical debate about the Federal Bill of 
Rights which took place in the U.S. House of Representatives in the summer of 1789. At 
some point during the debate, the issue about whether amendments to the Constitution 
should be discussed was raised. Anti-Federalists were keen to, but Federalists were 
determined to prevent the discussion from taking place. To this end, one of the Federalist 
representatives, Mr. James Jackson of Georgia, proposed that the discussion should be 
postponed for ten months. He argued that the best scenario would be to first try the 
Constitution out, experience it first hand, and then discuss any amendments later. 
In my view, searching for fallacies that have not (yet) been discerned in fallacy 
theory is a useful activity—especially if one is searching for fallacies that are connected 
to as specific a context as the political one. However, I have some doubts about whether 
the discussion move ad socordiam should be qualified as a fallacy at all. According to 
Rudanko, a fallacy is defined by two characteristics. The first is that a proponent of the 
discussion move is trying to prevail over an opponent, i.e. the proponent is doing his or 
her best to persuade an opponent of the correctness of his or her argument. The second is 
that the move is “counter-constructive.” Counter-constructiveness is a term which can be 
used to describe a poor argument that fails to support a claim, and therefore, according to 
Rudanko: “impede[s] the proper unfolding of a dialogue.” It can also be used to describe 
the proponent’s hidden agenda. It is this latter usage, the deceptive one, which is at issue 
in an ad socordiam discussion move. The proponent claims to be simply postponing a 
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matter, but secretly he or she does not want the matter to ever come up again. To be able 
to analyse such a move as a fallacy, we have to make an appeal to the arguer’s intention. 
According to Rudanko this is no problem, because, in linguistic pragmatics discovering a 
speaker’s intention on the basis of knowledge about context, co-text, speaker and hearer, 
is an every day practise.  
My first concern is that it is not very helpful to use a speaker’s intention as a 
method of identifying a discussion move as a fallacy. One of the logical consequences of 
using a method like this is that the same utterance must be judged fallacious when the 
intention is bad and sound when the intention is good. In other words: proposing a 
postponement is deemed to be fallacious when the speaker is actually hoping for a 
cancellation, but not when the speaker is submitting the proposal sincerely. This makes 
the identification of fallacies problematic, even if one wants to use linguistic pragmatics 
to determine an arguer’s intention. The method used to search for intention which is 
sketched out by Rudanko differs from the one which is practised in pragmatics. 
Pragmatic theories take the formulation of an utterance as their starting point. If the 
utterances literal meaning is, in the given context, irrelevant, pointless, superfluous or 
obviously dishonest, then there is reason to believe that the speaker meant something 
other than, or different to, what he or she explicitly stated. In such a case the speaker is 
committed to the interpreted other, or different meaning, by his or her explicit utterance. 
It is not evident how Jackson’s proposal to postpone the consideration of amendments to 
a later date, in itself, gives one reason to believe that something else may be meant.  
I know that Rudanko thinks differently because, in one of his 2005 publications, 
he writes that Jackson’s discussion move violates the Gricean maxim of Quantity (see 
references). According to Rudanko (p. 734), Jackson’s move is not informative enough, 
because he only says that he is proposing that a discussion of the amendments be 
postponed; this gives too little information about his intentions. This seems circular 
reasoning to me: only after a second intention is attributed to Jackson it is concluded that 
he violated the maxim because of this second intention. The interpretation of the intention 
which should have been incited by finding a violation of a maxim, now functions, at the 
same time, as a reason to conclude that a violation of a maxim has occurred. But Gricean 
interpretation works the other way around and starts with an utterance’s literal meaning. 
It must first be established that taking a certain utterance literally implies the violating of 
a maxim, and only then can another meaning be attributed to the utterance. There is also 
no evidence to support the idea that Jackson’s move is a violation of sincerity (the maxim 
of Quality), as Rudanko does in the same paper. The problem with sincerity is that the 
lack of it cannot usually be established, unless the speaker is obviously being dishonest—
and the maxim is being exploited. In most other cases we have no option other than to 
hold that a speaker is committed to his or her words and their implications, whether he or 
she is sincere or not (unless, of course, there is manifest and undeniable evidence which 
proves that the speaker is demonstrably lying).  
The commitments that a speaker has bring me to my second concern. Can 
Jackson’s proposal for a postponement really be qualified as deceptive, and therefore as 
counter-constructive? Mr. Goodhue and Mr. Madison were not deceived, as is clear from 
the accusations they made concerning Jackson’s altogether negative attitude towards the 
amendments. However, as far as I can gather from the quotations in the paper, levelling 
these accusations did not lead to the development of a no/yes argument with Jackson 
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about his real intentions, because Jackson did not refute the accusations, but simply 
renewed his argument for his proposal. And this is the only way that the discussion, in 
my view, could proceed. Jackson was committed to his proposal. If Goodhue and 
Madison did not like it, their duty was to argue with Jackson about the reasons he had for 
making the proposal. If Jackson’s reasons were poor, Goodhue and Madison would 
merely have to illustrate this and Jackson’s proposal would not gain adherence. However, 
if Jackson’s reasons were good, then Goodhue and Madison would have to outweigh 
these by producing even better ones, and if they were unable to do so, they should give 
in. This is how a discussion should develop, and this cannot be altered by one of the 
discussants promoting an alleged hidden agenda. In other words: a hidden agenda does 
not have to be counter-constructive, because the discussion can proceed quite well on the 
basis of the commitments of the participants.  
Be that as it may, the idea of counter-constructiveness can be a fruitful one indeed 
and, on this point, I fully agree with Rudanko. In my view, the pragma-dialectical theory 
of argumentation has developed this concept in a very systematic and practicable way. In 
this theory, discussion moves are fallacies if they obstruct the critical testing of a 
standpoint. In concrete terms, this means that fallacies are discussion moves that violate 
one of the rules which are essential for a critical discussion to take place. In such a 
discussion resolving a difference of opinion is the goal and the procedure for reaching 
this goal consists of critically testing the standpoint that the speaker has. According to 
this definition of a fallacy, Jackson’s secret agenda really isn’t one at all. None of the 
rules of discussion forbids one from having an opinion that is different from what one 
actually says. Discussants are committed to what they actually say, not what they secretly 
think—this is the pragma-dialectical meta-theoretical principle of externalisation (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, p. 52-55). Applying the pragma-dialectical theory, it is 
rather Goodhue and Madison who are committing a fallacy. But a conclusive judgement 
cannot be made, because the reader can only rely on the quotations included in the paper. 
However, the speaker’s remarks about Jackson’s hidden agenda appear to be used to 
portray him as a discussant who cannot have good reasons for his proposal anyway, 
because he is biased. Such a move must be qualified as an ad hominem fallacy: trying to 
make a speaker’s contribution to the discussion look worthless by addressing his 
personality—which includes his motives—instead of his words. A move such as this is 
truly counter-constructive.  
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